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EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONSThe Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate
Setting: A Suggested Approach
The extent to which the attorney-client evidentiary privilege applies to communications made by employees of a corporation to the
corporation's attorney was recently reconsidered in the case of
Harper & Row Publishers, Incorporated v. Decker. 1 This issue arose
during the pretrial discovery proceedings for a major antitrust suit
before the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. A group of state and local governments, public schools, and
public libraries sued book publishers and wholesalers for treble
damages arising from alleged conspiracies that inflated the price of
children's editions of library books.2 The plaintiffs deposed approximately one hundred witnesses, many of whom had testified before a
federal grand jury that had taken part in prior criminal proceedings
against the defendant publishers.3 Due to the passage of time and to
the alleged recalcitrance of the deponents, the plaintiffs felt that the
testimony produced in the depositions was both incomplete and misleading.4 Consequently, they filed a motion pursuant to rule 34 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" seeking inspection of the
Court in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (see text accompanying notes 63-67
supra). It could be argued that if the values asserted in the initial challenge to the
zoning ordinances were sufficiently fundamental to satisfy the close-scrutiny equal
protection test, they should also be entitled to protection against state-enforced restrictive covenants as was the case in Shelley. Although the Supreme Court has not
extended Shelley beyond the precise factual situation involved in that case, it would
seem shortsighted indeed to allow the goal sought in challenging the zoning law to
be so easily circumvented. However, even if Shelley is not extended to lot-size restrictive covenants, the fact that such covenants could achieve the same result as the
challenged zoning ordinance does not provide a sufficient reason for a refusal by a
court to invalidate the offensive zoning laws. The state should not be allowed to
discriminate even if private persons are allowed to. Moreover, there is no assurance
that the restrictive covenants would result in every case, and therefore the invalidation
of the zoning laws might still have a significant effect.
I. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1073 (1970) (No. 1337, 1969 Term;
renumbered No. 113, 1970 Term).
2. More than forty suits, originating in eight judicial districts, were consolidated,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), before Judge Bernard M. Decker
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for discovery
and pretrial proceedings. Illinois v. Harper &: Row Publishers, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 37
(N.D. Ill. 1969), revd. in part sub nom. Harper &: Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423
F.2d 487 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1073 (1970) (No. 1337, 1969 Term, renumbered No. 113, 1970 Term).
3. In 1966 the United States had convened a criminal grand jury to investigate the
alleged incidents. After the testimony of nearly ninety witnesses, the United States decided not to seek any indictments. 50 F.R.D. at 39.
4. 50 F.R.D. at 39.
5. FED. R. Crv. P. 34 states: "Upon motion by any party showing good cause therefor ••• and subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b), the court ••• may (1) order any
party to produce and permit the inspection • • • of any designated documents • • ••"
FED. R. Cxv. P. 30(b) allows various orders for the protection of the parties during
discovery.
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grand-jury transcripts containing the testimony of eleven of the
witnesses and of certain "debriefing" statements that the defendants'
attorneys had prepared by interviewing the witnesses after they had
testified before the grand jury. 6 The defendant publishers resisted
the motion on the grounds that the documents were protected against
such production by the personal attorney-client privilege,7 by the
corporate attorney-client privilege, or by the "work product" doctrine.8
District Judge Bernard Decker ruled that the requested grandjury transcripts should be released. 9 He further held that the debriefing statements, with one exception, were not protected by the
personal attorney-client privilege because "the attorneys did not (1)
render personal legal advice after the witnesses completed their
grand-jury testimony, (2) advise them on other personal matters,
or (3) bill the witnesses for their services." 10 In addition, by utilizing the "control group" test11 to determine the extent to which
the corporate attorney-client privilege applied to the debriefing
statements, he held that only two of the witnesses were members of
the control group, and that therefore only the statements of those two
witnesses were protected.12 As for the statements that were not protected by either the personal or corporate attorney-client privilege,
he held that most of them were not the work product of an attorney, 13 and that those that were14 could not be protected against
6. The statements consisted of summaries of the witnesses' testimony as prepared
by the witnesses themselves or as recorded by the defendants' attorneys on the basis
of interviews with the witnesses immediately after testifying. 50 F.R.D. at 42-44.
7. In general, the attorney-client privilege prohibits the compelled disclosure of
confidential communications between attorney and client. See text accompanying notes
31-39 infra for Wigmore's statement of the general principle.
8. The "work product" of an attorney includes "interviews, statements, memoranda,
correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal briefs, and countless other tangible
and intangible" items. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). In Hickman, the
Supreme Court held that under the Federal Rules "adequate reasons" must be established by the moving party in order to justify the production of such material by court
order. 329 U.S. at 512.
9. Judge Decker stated, "The disclosure of grand jury minutes is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial judge," and concluded that the facts presented in this
case revealed "a compelling need for the disclosure of the requested minutes.'' 50
F.R.D. at 39-40.
IO. 50 F.R.D. at 43.
11. Under the control group test, a communication to an attorney is privileged if
made by an employee who has the authority to make or take a substantial part in a
decision about any action that the corporation might take on the advice of an attorney.
See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.
1962). See also text accompanying notes 60-62, and pt. I. C. 3. infra.
12. The court observed that "[w]hile other witnesses, such as sales executives and
regional managers, might have shaped the pricing policies concerning library editions,
they did not participate in the corporate problem about which legal advice was sought
-the company's litigation response to the price fixing cases." 50 F.R.D. at 44.
13. The court reached this conclusion by finding that "[t]he lawyers functioned
primarily as investigators. By asking questions and recording the answers, they at•
tempted to reconstruct the witnesses' grand-jury testimony. Such peripheral partici-
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production because the plaintiffs had proven the "good cause" and
"special circumstances"15 that are necessary in order to require pro.
duction of the work-product of an attorney under rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.16
Because they failed in an attempt to have the matter certified for
interlocutory appeal,17 the defendants petitioned the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for a writ of mandamus to
compel the district court to vacate that portion of its production
order that permitted the plaintiffs to inspect the debriefing memoranda. The writ was granted in part and denied in part.18
The appellate court upheld the lower court's findings that the
personal and corporate attorney-client privileges did not apply to the
debriefing statements that were obtained from former employees and
from employees of other corporations.19 It further held that the
"good cause" required to be proven for production under rule 34
had been sufficiently established.20 However, the court of appeals
reversed the district court on the question whether the corporate
attorney-client privilege applied to statements made by persons who
were employees of the corporation at the time the statements were
made. Although the appellate court conceded that Judge Decker had
correctly applied the control group test,21 it ruled that the privilege
pation by a lawyer does not convert a factual summary into his work product." 50
F.R.D. at 44 (emphasis added). In support of this conclusion, the court quoted from
Bifferato v. States Marine Corp., 11 F.R.D. 44, 46, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), for the proposition that "[t]he rationale underlying ••• [Hickman v. Taylor] was intended to apply
only when [an attorney] acts in his true professional capacity." 50 F.R.D. at 44.

14. These statements included the "counsel's 'recollections, observations, comments
and impressions about [the witness1 report of his appearance before the grand jury.' "
50 F.R.D. at 44.
15. For Judge Decker's lengthy enumeration of the factors that he felt established
good cause, see 50 F.R.D. at 45.
16. See note 5 supra.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964) allows a district judge in a civil action, when making
an order that is otherwise not appealable, to certify in the order that such order involves a controlling question of law "as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation." The court of appeals then has discretion
to permit an appeal to be taken from the order. Judge Decker, however, followed the
holding in Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1964), and
denied certification on the ground that interlocutory appeal under the circumstances
presented would not facilitate the final disposition of the case. Brief for Petitioners at
6, Decker v. Harper&: Row Publishers, Inc., 397 U.S. 1073 (1970).
18. Harper&: Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir.), cert. granted,
397 U.S. 1073 (1970) (No. 1337, 1969 Term; renumbered No. 113, 1970 Term). The
writ was sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 165l(a) (1964).
19. The court stated that the attorney-client privileges had not been clearly enough
established in this area to justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus. 423 F.2d at 490.
20. But the court did indicate that "(w]here an attorney personally prepares a
memorandum of an interview of a witness with an eye toward litigation such memorandum qualifies as work product even though the lawyer functioned primarily as
an investigator.'' 423 F.2d at 492.
21. 423 F.2d at 491.
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did apply to these statements. This holding was based on the court's
feeling that the control group test was not wholly adequate because
it failed to distinguish between employees who are not part of the
control group, and who are therefore "virtually indistinguishable
from bystander witnesses," and those employees who should properly
be deemed corporate agents for purposes of the privilege.22 Therefore, the production order was held to have been improperly issued
to the extent that it relied solely on the control group test. The court
then formulated its own test for determining which statements were
protected by the corporate attorney-client privilege:
[A]n employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control
group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his communication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the
employee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors
in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the
attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the
communication is the performance by the employee of the duties
of his employment.2s

Consequently, a writ of mandamus ordering the partial reversal of
the production order was issued on the grounds that "maintenance
of the attorney-client privilege up to its proper limits has substantial
importance in the administration of justice, and [that] an appeal
after disclosure of the privileged communication is an inadequate
remedy ... .''24
The plaintiffs responded to the issuance of the writ of mandamus
by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court, which was subsequently granted. 25 Certiorari was
granted for consideration of both the question of the efficacy of using
a writ of mandamus to reverse a trial court's discovery or¢1.er to produce documents and the question whether the court of appeals improperly held that the attorney-client privilege "extends to narrative
statements solicited by corporate counsel from non-management
employees about their grand-jury testimony." 26
The wide chasm between the position taken by the district court
and that taken by the court of appeals appropriately illustrates the
degree of confusion that currently exists concerning which individuals within a corporation may function as the client for purposes of
the attorney-client privilege. However, it is submitted that such confusion is not necessary and can be eliminated. This Note will first
review the development of the personal attorney-client privilege and
22. 42!1 F.2d at 491.
2!1. 42!1 F.2d at 491·92.
24. 42!1 F.2d at 492.
25. Decker v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 397 U.S. 1073 (1970) (No. 1337, 1969
Term; renumbered No. 113, 1970 Term).
26. Brief for Petitioners at 2, Decker v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., !197 U.S.
107!1 (1970).
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the extent to which the term "client" has been expanded for use
with that privilege. Then, the development of the corporate attorneyclient privilege will be examined with an eye toward isolating the
tests that the courts have used to define the extent of the term "client." Finally, with the results of these examinations in mind, an approach will be suggested that, if adopted by the courts, could effectively eliminate the confusion that presently exists with regard to the
scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting.
I.

TRADITIONAL APPROACHES

A. The Personal Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is considered to be the "oldest of
the privileges for confidential communications."27 It dates back to at
least 1577, when the privilege was regarded as a point of honor-a
consideration for the oath and honor of the attorney.28 However, the
policy underlying the use of the privilege has changed. Today, the
privilege embodies a policy that seeks to encourage freedom of consultation with legal advisors by removing apprehension of compelled
disclosure by the attorney of client communications.29 But because
the nature of the information that is withheld in particular cases can
never be pinpointed, it is difficult-if not impossible-to determine
whether the privilege does in fact promote freedom of consultation
and encourage full disclosure of material information to one's legal
advisor. This speculative nature of the benefits of the privilege serves
as the basis for the countervailing policy that, while the privilege
should be allowed, it should "be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle."39 The
inherent conflict between these two countervailing policies does not
appear in the usual case involving the application of the personal
privilege. But when the attorney-client privilege is applied in a
corporate setting, in which the client is an artificial entity operating
through agents, the conflicting policies collide and frequently lead
to judicial confusion.
In the usual case involving the personal privilege the courts rely
on and apply Wigmore's famous eight-element test: 31
(I) Where legal advice of any kind is sought 32 (2) from a professional
27. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 229~, at 542 (3d ed. J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
28. Id. § 2290.
29. Id. § 2291. This policy developed during the eighteenth century. Id. § 2290.
30. Id. § 2291, at 554. As pointed out by an early Massachusetts court, "this rule
of privilege, having a tendency to prevent the full disclosure of the truth, ought to be
construed strictly." Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 89, 97 (1831).
31. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2292, at 554 (footnotes added).
32. See id. §§ 2294-99.
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legal advisor in his capacity as such,83 (3) the communications relating to that purpose,84 (4) made in confidence35 (5) by the client,86
(6) are at his instance permanently protected31 (7) from disclosure
by himself or by the legal advisor,38 (8) except the protection be
waived.39

Of these elements, the fifth is of primary concern in defining the
corporate privilege. In light of the first two elements, it is clear that
the term "client" should include any person who seeks legal advice
from a professional legal advisor. But over the years the courts have
expanded this definition, and thereby held that a communication
will be considered to be from the client when it is from or through
an agent, employee, or interpreter; 40 or when, if the client is incapable of communicating correct and sufficient information, it is a
report by a specialist or expert employed by the client or by the
attomey.41 More specifically, the privilege has been extended to protect a physician's report prepared to aid the attorney in preparation
for litigation,42 reports by experts or special agents employed by the
client,43 and a statement obtained by the client's insurance company
33. See id. ~§ 2300-04.
84. See id. §§ 2306-10. "Communication" includes, among other things, "documents
delivered or shown to the attorney at a consultation •.••" Id. § 2307, at 591.
35. See id. §§ 2311-16.
36. See id. §§ 2317-20.
37. See id. §§ 2321-23.
38. See id. §§ 2324-26.
39. See id. §§ 2327-29.
40. Id. § 2317.
41. See, e.g., City &: County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231
P.2d 26 (1951), discussed in note 42 infra. See also note 43 infra.
42. In C:ty &: County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d
26 (1951), the sole purpose of a medical examination was to aid the attorney in
preparation for litigation. In writing the opinion, Justice Traynor relied heavily on
§ 2317 of 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 27 (3d ed. 1940). He concluded:
Thus, when communication by a client to his attorney regarding his physical or
mental condition requires the assistance of a physician to interpret the client's
condition to the attorney, the client may submit to an examination by the physician without fear that the latter will be compelled to reveal the information dis•
closed.
37 Cal. 2d at 237, 231 P.2d at 31. This case was relied on by the Michigan supreme
court when a similar situation arose in Michigan:
Had [the plaintiff] possessed the requisite training and skill to make an accurate
appraisal of her physical condition and to draw reasonable conclusions there•
from ••• any communication by her to her attorney of such appraisal and diagnosis would without question have been privileged •••• To accomplish the desired
result the attorney representing her deemed it necessary to employ a medical
expert to act for him and his client and to convey to him on behalf of his client
the information he needed ••.•
Lindsay v. Lipson, 367 Mich. 1, 5-6, 116 N.W.2d 60, 62 (1962).
. 43. A report was held to be privileged when it was prepared by a party sent by
an insured, at the suggestion of his solicitors, to a foreign country for the express
purpose of collecting evidence on behalf of the insured in support of his litigation.
Steele v. Stewart, 41 Eng. Rep. 711 (Ch. 1844).
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that was later transmitted to the attorney defending the client in a
related criminal action.44
Bearing in mind the conflicting policies underlying the attorneyclient privilege and the extent to which the term "client" has been
expanded in the context of the individual privilege, the question of
determining who may be regarded as representing the client in the
corporate context may be examined.

B. Historical Development of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege
Prior to the decision by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois in Radiant Burners) Incorporated v.
American Gas Association,45 it was widely assumed that the attorneyclient privilege applied to corporations as well as to individuals.46
While the district court's decision in Radiant Burners, which held
that the privilege did not apply to corporations,47 was reversed, 48 it
still gave rise to speculation and concern about the extent to which
the privilege should apply to corporations. In its opinion reversing
the lower court, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed itself to this speculation when it stated that the privilege "is
worth preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it is nonetheless
an obstacle to the investigation of the truth. It ought to be strictly
confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the
logic of its principle."49 Thus, while it appears to be settled, at least
44. After a discussion of both sides of the issue, the Illinois supreme court con•
eluded that "[u]nder such circumstances we believe that the insured may properly
assume that the communication is made to the insurer as an agent for the dominant
purpose of transmitting it to an attorney for the protection of the interests of the
insured." People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 461, 197 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1964).
45. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962), revd., 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 929 (1963).
46. See notes 47 &: 48 infra. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 209 (1942) states: "As
used in Rules 210 to 213 .•• 'client' means a person or corporation ••••" UNIFORM
RULE OF EVIDENCE 26(3)(2) (1953) states that " 'client' means a person or corporation •..."
47. The district judge stated that his research led him "to conclude that a corpora•
tion's right to assert the privilege has somewhat generally been taken for granted by
the judiciary •••." 207 F. Supp. at 772. He then went on to hold that the privilege
did not apply to corporations because (I) historically the privilege was "fundamentally
personal in nature" and thus could "be claimed only by natural individuals and not
by mere corporate entities" (207 F. Supp. at 773); and (2) the element of secrecy re•
quired for the privilege would be impossible within the modem corporate structure
(207 F. Supp. at 773-74).
48. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Assn., 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). The court of appeals stated that "based on history, principle,
precedent and public policy the attorney-client privilege in its broad sense is available
to corporations ••••" 320 F.2d at 323. In its opinion, the court listed cases that had
recognized the privilege as applicable to corporations. 320 F.2d at 319 n.7.
49. 320 F.2d at 323, quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2291, at 554. See note 30
supra and accompanying text.
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in the federal courts, that the privilege does apply to corporations,ro
it is not clear which persons within a corporation can communicate
with an attorney and be reasonably assured that the communication
will be privileged.
Before the decision in Radiant Burners, two approaches were
used by the courts to resolve that issue: the privilege was either extended to communications by any employee of the corporation, or
only to those made by selected agents of the corporation. The former,
"broad" approach was applied by Judge Wyzanski in United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corporation. 51 He held that when
letters to or from independent lawyers were prepared to solicit or
give an opinion on law or legal services, such parts of them are privileged as contain, or have opinions based on, information furnished
by an officer or employee of the [corporation] in confidence and
without the presence of third persons.52

A subsequent decision that adhered to this line of reasoning implied
that the corporate client, for purposes of the attorney-client privilege,
included "employees, officers, directors." 53 However, none of the
courts that have adopted this approach appear to have explained in
detail why such a broad range of protection should be granted to
corporations.154
The second traditional approach, which applies the privilege only
to communications from certain employees or agents, was developed
in D. I. Chadbourne, Incorporated v. Superior Court. 55 In that case
an insurance corporation's attorneys had employed a firm to investigate accidents and to transmit the reports to them. The California
supreme court held that the reports would have been privileged if
under all the circumstances of the case, he [the employee making the
communication] is the natural person to be speaking for the corporation; that is to say, that the privilege will not attach in such case
unless the communication constitutes information which emanates
50. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE
UNITED STATES, RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND
MAGISTRATES rule 5-03(a)(l) (Preliminary Draft March 1969), reprinted in 46 F.R.D. 126,
249 (1969), which states that "[a) 'client' is ••. a corporation ..••"
51. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
52. 89 F. Supp. at 359 (em;,hasis added).
53. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Del.
1954) (emphasis added). See also Hammond Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 1962 Trade
Cas. ,J 70,192 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp.
251 (N.D.N.Y. 1960), in which the court relied on United Shoe and Zenith; Phillips v.
Delaware Power & Light Co., 194 A.2d 690 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963).
54. See Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE
L.J. 953, 960 (1956). For a typical case that demonstrates this failure to discuss the
rationale behind the broad approach, see Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 13
F.R.D. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
55. 60 Cal. 2d 723, !188 P.2d 700, !16 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1964).
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from the corporation (as distinct from the nonlitigant employee),
and the communicating employee is such a person who would
ordinarily be utilized for communication to the corporation's attorney.56
The courts that applied this approach appear to have relied on the
well-established rule that a client may communicate to his attorney
through an agent, 57 or on the ground that the reports were created as
a necessary means of making a confidential communication with the
attorney. 58
Thus, at the time Radiant Burners was decided some courtsincluding most federal courts-were taking a broad approach by
holding that a communication from any employee was privileged,
and others were taking a more selective approach by holding that a
communication was privileged only when the employee making the
communication would be the "natural" or appropriate person to be
speaking for the corporation.
After Radiant Burners the courts continued to employ both of
these tests. 59 However, a third approach was also developed. This
theory, which was first enunciated by Judge Kirkpatrick in City of
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 60 has become
known as the "control group" test. Under this test a communication
will be held to be privileged
if the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he
56. 60 Cal. 2d at 736-37, 388 P.2d at 709, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 477 (emphasis added).
Other cases applying the natural-person approach include Sierra Vista Hosp. v.
Superior Court, 248 Cal. App. 2d 359, 56 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1967); People v. Glen Arms
Estates, Inc., 230 Cal. App. 2d 841, 41 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1965); Ford Motor Co,
v. O.W. Burke Co., 59 Misc. 2d 543, 299 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
Apparently, none of the federal courts have explicitly adopted this approach.
57. Wigmore says: "A communication, then, by any form of agency employed or
set in motion by the client is within the privilege." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 27,
§ 2317, at 618. This principle was applied in the corporate setting in Schmitt
v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413 (1942). The privileged statement in that
case was taken by the claims agent "after consultation with and by direction of
the company's attorneys and immediately turned ••• over to them for use in anticipation of litigation ••••" 211 Minn. at 550, 2 N.W.2d at 415.
In some situations the courts have applied the privilege to agents without any
discussion as to the rationale for this application. See, e.g., Fire Assn. of Philadelphia
v. Flemming, 78 Ga. 733, 3 S.E. 420 (1887).
58. In Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P .2d 1025 (1954), certain reports
and photographs were prepared by agents of the defendant's employer and were given
in confidence to the attorneys for the defendant and his employer for use in possible
litigation. The California supreme court stated that "(i]t follows that where the communication is between corporate employees and is embodied in reports • • • for the
purpose of redelivery to a corporate attorney the privilege attaches if the reports • • •
were created as a means of communicating confidential information • • • ." 42 Cal. 2d
at 508, 267 P .2d at 1029.
59. See notes 53 & 56 supra.
60. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandate denied sub nom. General Elec. Co.
v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
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may be, is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part
in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon
the advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized member of a
body or group which has that authority, [because] then, in effect,
he is (or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure
to the lawyer ••• ,e1

Several courts have adopted this approach and have held that the
control group is limited to upper-echelon management personnel. 62
As a result, the protection afforded by the privilege is restricted to
communications made by or to a very small group of individuals
within any given corporation.
C. Evaluation of the Traditional Tests
Thus, the spectrum of views that are presently voiced by the
courts consists of a broad (any employee) approach, a selective
(natural person) approach, and a narrow (control group) approach.
Each of these approaches has its own strong and weak points.

I. Broad Approach63
Those who favor the broad approach argue that the diffuse structure of a corporation requires proportionally broad coverage in
order to carry out the privilege's underlying purpose of assuring the
client that his full and frank communications concerning legal matters will not be subject to compulsory disclosure. 64 This argument is
buttressed by a feeling on the part of the judges who adhere to this
approach that the harm caused by a restriction of the attorney-client
privilege would greatly outweigh any resulting positive effects. As
stated by one federal district court judge, "I am, frankly, hesitant to
do anything which would contribute to the undermining of the protection afforded by the time-honored rule which excludes from evi61. 210 F. Supp. at 485.
62. In Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515, 518 (S.D. Cal. 1963), a
district court held that the control group included only directors, officers, department
heads, division managers and their first assistants, and division chief engineers. In
Hogan v. Zietz, 43 F.R.D. 308, 315 (N.D. Okla. 1967), modified on other grounds sub
nom. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968), division managers and their assistants
were considered to be members of the control group. In Congoleum Indus., Inc. v.
GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1969), corporate vice presidents and a division
vice president and general manager were considered to be part of the corporation's
control group. See also Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 5 TRADE REc.
REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) ,r 73,122 (M.D. Pa. March 27, 1970); Goliminas v. Fred Teitelbaum Constr. Co., 112 Ill. App. 2d 445, 251 N.E.2d 314 (1969); Day v. Illinois Power
Co., 50 Ill. App. 2d 52, 199 N.E.2d 802 (1964).
63. See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Hammond Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 1962 Trade Cas. ,r 70,192,
at 75,680 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193
F. Supp. 251, 252 (N.D.N.Y. 1960).
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dence such confidential communications." 65 Further, this approach's
ease of application creates a measure of predictability on which attorneys and corporations can rely. Thus, the broad approach encourages the disclosure of all relevant information and thereby fosters the
underlying purpose of the privilege.
However, because of the approach's broad coverage, it is susceptible of abuse and tends to create a wide "zone of silence"66 around
corporate affairs. For example, because a communication to an attorney from any employee will be privileged, a corporation could funnel
masses of information through its attorney and thus bring communications that would not normally be privileged under the umbrella of
protection. As one author has stated, "[w]here corporations are involved, with their large numbers of agents, masses of documents, and
frequent dealings with lawyers, the zone of silence grows large. Few
judges ... would long tolerate any common-law privilege that allowed corporations to insulate all their activities by discussing them
with legal advisers." 67
It is also argued that the approach is in direct conflict with the
dictum of the case of Hickman v. Taylor, 68 which involved memoranda prepared by a corporation's attorney that summarized his
interviews with some of the corporation's employees. The Supreme
Court held that although the memoranda were part of the attorney's
"work product," they were not covered by the attorney-client privilege. In reaching this conclusion, the Court asserted that "the protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to information which
an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in
anticipation· of litigation."69 Since the witnesses in Hickman were
employees of the corporation, it is clear that the Supreme Court did
not regard the privilege as extending to communications from all
corporate employees. One district court that has followed the Hickman line of reasoning has suggested that when an employee gives information to his corporate employer's attorney, the key question in
determining whether the privilege applies is "was he at the time, in
contemplation of law, the corporation seeking advice?" 70 I£ the question may be answered affirmatively, the communication should be
privileged. But when an employee gives information in order that
someone other than himself can receive advice, the employee is
65. A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
66. The phrase "zone of silence" was apparently coined by David Simon in 1956.
Simon, supra note 54, at 955.
67. Id. at 955-56.
68. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
69. 329 U.S. at 508.
10:·city of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485
(E.D. Pa.) mandate denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742
(3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
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merely a witness. Therefore, a holding that his communication is
privileged-as would be the conclusion under the broad approachwould violate the spirit and intent of Hickman. 71
In response to this argument it can be asserted that the Court in
Hickman made no effort to define the situations in which an employee will be considered a witness rather than the corporate client.
It merely held that in the particular fact situation before it, the
communications were made by witness-employees. Hence, it might be
argued that the broad approach presents no necessary conflict with
Hickman. But because the broad approach protects communications
to attorneys made by all employees, including those who are merely
witnesses, it frequently violates the Hickman dictum.
In summary, then, it can be said that courts that have utilized the
broad approach have failed to examine each of the two policies that
underlie the attorney-client privilege: by concerning itself solely
with the promotion of the freedom of attorney consultation, the
broad approach overlooks the need to prevent corporations from
abusing the privilege. Thus, it is submitted that the broad approach's
appeal as an easy-to-apply formula is greatly outweighed by its dangerous tendency to stimulate the formation of unnecessarily broad
zones of silence.

2. Selective Approach72
Those who favor the selective approach argue that it extends the
privilege to corporations only to the degree necessary in order to
foster the basic purposes of the privilege. This approach is based on
the premise that "[a] corporation is entitled to the same treatment
as any other 'client'-no more and no less. If it seeks legal advice
from an attorney, and in that relationship confidentially communicates information relating to the advice sought, it [should be protected] from disclosure ...." 73 But this approach also recognizes that
"reason dictates that the corporation not be given greater privileges
than are enjoyed by a natural person merely because it must utilize
a [natural] person in order to speak." 74 Proponents of the selective
approach feel that it fosters the policies underlying the attorneyclient privilege because it recognizes that many people within a
corporation may function as the corporate client, yet restricts the
71. 210 F. Supp. at 485.
72. See notes 55-58 supra and accompanying text.
73. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Assn., 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir.) cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). See also D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.
2d 723, 736, 388 P .2d 700, 709, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 477 (1964), in which the California
supreme court stated: "Certainly the public policy behind the attorney-client privilege
requires that an artificial person be given equal opportunity with a natural person to
communicate with its attorney • • • ."
74. D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 736, 388 P.2d 700, 709,
36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 477 (1964).

372

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 69

privilege's coverage to only those persons who are identified with
the interests of the corporation. These proponents, therefore, urge
that the selective approach reduces the likelihood that a zone of
silence will be created around a corporation.
However, this approach has the decided disadvantage of failing to
produce predictable results. This lack of predictability stems from
the fact that the courts that have used the test have made no attempt
to define what attributes an employee must possess in order to be
considered the natural person to be speaking for the corporation.
These courts have subjectively viewed situations after communications have been made, and have then retrospectively determined
whether the privilege should apply. In so doing, they have failed to
provide objective guides for determining future conduct. As a result,
an attorney and his client have little to rely on when attempting to
predict whether a particular communication will be privileged.
Therefore, a client may feel inhibited about what he can tell his
attorney, thereby impairing the effectiveness of his attorney's representation.
Thus, although the selective approach represents an effort by the
courts to mold what was originally an individual privilege into a
privilege that fits the structure of the modern corporation, its usefulness is severely limited by its failure to provide objective guidelines that an attorney can use to aid his initial appraisal of which
employees will or will not be covered. Because of this uncertainty,
the selective or natural-person approach provides an undesirable
standard for determining the scope of the corporate attorney-client
privilege.

3. Narrow Approach15
The narrow or control group approach appears to be based on
the premise expressed in Radiant Burners that the privilege is "fundamentally personal,"76 coupled with the general policy that the
attorney-client privilege should not be unduly extended. 77 Under
this approach, the control group of a corporation-normally consisting of its board of directors and chief officers18-is regarded as
that group of people in the corporation that is most analogous to an
individual client, because it is the responsibility of the officers and
directors "to fear for the well-being of the corporation just as an
individual fears for his own well-being." 79 Thus, the narrow ap75. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text.
76. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Assn., 207 F. Supp. 771, 773 (N.D. m.
1962) reud., 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). See note 47 supra.
77. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Assn., 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir.
1963), and note 30 supra and accompanying text.
78. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
79. Comment, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the
Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 235, 241 (1961). The
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proach limits the extent of the privilege to communications by those
who control, take a substantial part in,80 or influence a corporate
decision. 81 It is this tight restriction on the class of individuals who
can make privileged communications and the resulting prevention of
zones of silence that comprise the greatest advantages of the narrow
or control group approach.
However, it has been argued that this approach is too artificial
and too narrow, because "[t]oo often middle management executives
who probably do not qualify for inclusion in the control group .•.
have responsibilities for making recommendations which are ratified
verbatim by the higher echelon management which [would] be a
part of the so-called 'control.' " 82 In fact, middle management may
include the parties whose statements most need protection because
these men frequently are the real decision makers. Another disadvantage of this approach is that it has failed to produce any objective
guides that can be used to predict who the courts will consider to be
members of the control group. The problems caused by this lack of
objective standards are best illustrated by Congoleum Industries, Incorporated v. GAF Corporation.83 In that case, a corporation had
appointed a special group to investigate possible patent litigation and
to furnish information to the attorney to be used as a basis for corporate decisions. The court concluded that the vice president for
operation and a division vice president and general manager were
the only members of the investigative group who were properly
members of the control group. Three other officers were found not
to be members of the control group on the ground that within the
special group they "held advisory as opposed to decision-making
positions." 84 Thus, the subjective nature of the control group test
concept that the board of directors is responsible for the management and affairs of
a corporation is contained in the corporation statutes of most states. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (Supp. 1968); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1963).
The authority of officers and other corporate agents is usually derived from the
articles of incorporation, bylaws, or resolutions of the board of directors. W. CARY,
CASES AND M!.TERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 150-53, 190-91 (4th ed. 1969). Since the officers
and directors are directly responsible to the owners of the corporation-the shareholders-for the corporation's day-to-day well-being, they are as analogous as possible
to the individual client for purposes of determining which persons fear for the wellbeing of the corporate client.
80. See City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485
(E.D. Pa.), mandate denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742
(3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963), and text accompanying note 60 supra.
81. Illinois v. Harper &: Row Publishers, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 37, 43 (N.D. Ill. 1969)
revd. in part sub nom. Harper &: Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th
Cir.), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1073 (1970) (No. 1337, 1969 Term; renumbered No. 113,
1970 Term).
82. Maurer, Privileged Communications and the Corporate Counsel, 28 ALA. LAW.
352, 375 (1967).
83. 49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
84. 49 F.R.D. at 85.

374

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 69

prevented the corporation from successfully structuring its investigation procedure to comply with the control group test and thereby
fully to avail itself of the privilege. As a result of decisions such as
that reached in Congoleum, corporations may hestitate fully to disclose to their attorney information pertinent to litigation.
Further, the courts that have utilized this approach appear to have
overlooked the fact that the individuals in a corporation can be
divided into two functional groups for purposes of the attorneyclient privilege: decision makers and givers of information. In the
context of the personal attorney-client privilege, the individual client
acts in both capacities-he gives information and then, based on the
attorney's advice, he makes a decision-and any communication
either to or from his attorney is privileged. The control group approach concentrates on only those employees in the corporation who
are decision makers and completely ignores the fact that information
must be given to the attorney before he can render legal advice. To
that extent, then, the narrow approach provides an incomplete
analogy to the individual privilege.
Thus, by concentrating on only one aspect of the total problem,
the control group approach fails to deal with all of the considerations
that underlie the privilege. As a result, the approach is not only unworkable for purposes of legal analysis, but may also be destructive
of the client's confidence in his attorney.
4. Balancing Approach
Because of the difficulties encountered by the broad, selective,
and narrow approaches, one commentator has suggested a case-bycase balancing approach.85 In essence this approach asks "whether the
good that the privilege seeks to accomplish-candor between client
and attorney-would be defeated unless the particular agent were
permitted to speak for the corporation."86 If the "good" would be
defeated, then this approach would privilege the communication. In
theory, this inquiry would promote full disclosure by corporate
clients to their attorneys, yet would not protect communications that
were not relevant to the promotion of such disclosure.
But while the balancing approach would do away with some of
the difficulties associated with the other approaches, it would be unworkably unpredictable and hence incompatible with the purpose of
the privilege-promoting full disclosure to attorneys. Its unpredictability is a result of the fact that it incorporates a subjective determination of what is privileged without providing objective guidelines. Thus, the balancing approach fails to correct the defect that
hampers the selective and narrow approaches-uncertainty.
85. Simon, supra note 54. See also Recent Case, 23 VAND. L. REv. 847, 854 (1970).
86. Simon, supra note 54, at 956.
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SUGGESTED APPROACH

A. Basic Precepts of a Sound Approach

The difficulties associated with all of these approaches suggest
that a viable corporate attorney-client privilege should satisfy at least
the following three precepts.
First, the corporate privilege should be as analogous as possible
to the privilege afforded individuals. Clearly, the fact that a corporation must utilize many persons to speak for it is not a valid reason
for granting it a greater privilege than that granted an individual.
For example, assume that a secretary, while looking out her office
window, saw one of her corporate employer's trucks collide with an
automobile driven by a private individual. A statement by that secretary to the private individual's attorney-or to the truck driver's
attorney-would not be privileged since she clearly was neither the
client nor a representative of the client. Consistency and fairness
would indicate that the corporation also should not be able to assert
the privilege in this situation. Moreover, since the privilege developed
as an individual privilege and since most judicial precedents in this
area relate to individuals, a corporate privilege analogous to the individual privilege would enable the courts to work within an established and familiar framework. The courts would thus be in a position to insure that the corporations would not receive greater benefit
from the privilege than would individuals.
A second precept should require the corporate privilege to be
structured so that it will foster the accomplishment of the purposes
underlying the privilege without unduly restraining the use of the
privilege by making it unpredictable and difficult to utilize. A vague
or unworkable standard is undesirable from both the attorney's and
the court's points of view. From the lawyer's viewpoint, the underlying policy of assuring a client that his communications will remain
confidential will be served only if the lawyer is able to predict, with
reasonable reliability, that a particular communication will be held
by a court to be privileged. A court, on the other hand, needs a workable approach in order to curb a corporation's attempt to establish
an overly broad zone of silence. Without clear guidelines, corporations might be tempted to create improperly broad zones of silence
in the hope that the courts would be unable or unwilling, because
of the difficulty in applying uncertain rules, to police the privilege
effectively.
In order to avoid any conflict with the holdings of the Supreme
Court, a third precept should require that a viable approach be
consistent with the dictum of Hickman v. Taylor. 87 The Court in
87. 829 U.S. 495, 508 (1947). See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
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Hickman stated that the privilege does not cover communications
from employees who are merely witnesses. Therefore, a suggested
approach should, as far as possible, draw a distinction between communications by witnesses who are also employees and communications by employees who are considered to be corporate clients.
Since each of the previously discussed approaches satisfies some
of these requirements,88 it would seem that a viable approach could
be constructed by combining the more desirable elements of each.
B. The Elements of the Suggested Approach
It is proposed that in determining whether the attorney-client
privilege exists in a particular case, the courts should ascertain
whether: (1) legal advice was being sought, (2) the advice was being
sought from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3)
the communication was related to the situation about which the
advice was sought, (4) the communication was made in a manner
such that it can be said that it was intended to be confidential, and
(5) the employee making the communication is within the definition
of "corporate client."
These elements are essentially the first five of the eight elements
delineated in Wigmore's formulation of the attorney-client privilege. 89 Because steps two and three concern the status of the attorney
and the nature of the communication, they are independent of the
nature of the client. Hence, the determination under those two
elements will be the same whether the client is an individual or a
corporation, and the rules and precedents established by the courts
for these elements in connection with the personal attorney-client
privilege can be applied unaltered to the corporate privilege. It is
only in conjunction with the other three steps that a slightly different
analysis is called for in order better to adapt the privilege to the
structure of the corporation.
I. Was Legal Advice Being Sought?
The court must first determine whether the corppration was
seeking legal advice as that term has been defined for application to
the personal attorney-client privilege.90 In order to answer this
question, it is submitted that the court should ascertain whether
someone with the proper authority to commit the corporation to take
88. The selective, narrow, and balancing approaches all attempt to .make the corporate privilege parallel to that afforded individuals, and also to exclude employees
who are more than witnesses from the privilege's coverage. However, the broad ap•
proach, which grants the privilege to communications by any corporate employees,
provides for more certainty. See the discussion of these approaches in pt. I. C. supra.
89. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2292, at 554. See text accompanying notes l!2·86
supra.
90. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 27, §§ 2294-99.
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legal action has taken the initial step of seeking legal advice. As was
previously pointed out, 91 an individual consulting an attorney performs two functions: he seeks advice upon which to make a decision,
and he provides information to the attorney so that the advice can
be given. At this point in the corporate-privilege inquiry the court
should be concerned only with examining those people in the corporation whose functions are analogous to the decision-making function in the individual dichotomy. 92 Thus, if someone in the corporation who is authorized to make a decision about legal action has
determined that the corporation should seek legal advice and the
corporation has acted on that determination, then this first step has
been satisfied. The precedents created in the determination of who
comprises the control group would be useful to courts in determining whether an authorized person has committed the corporation to
some form of legal action. As used in this particular context, the
control group would be limited to those persons who have actual
corporate authority to commit the corporation to legal action; thus
step one would involve primarily a factual determination.

2. Was the Communication in Confidence?
Once a court has concluded that the corporation has sought legal
advice from an attorney and has made or received a communication
pertinent to such advice, it should consider whether the communication to the attorney was made in confidence. The basic difficulty
encountered with this determination stems from the fact that a
corporation functions only through its agents. In order to understand this difficulty, one must delineate the two situations in which
it can arise. The first situation can best be described by illustration.
Assume that a factual report of an incident giving rise to litigation
involving C corporation is prepared by E, an employee of the corporation. Assume further that this report would be privileged if
transferred directly from E to the corporation's attorney. However,
C's policy and the necessity of insuring that E has made a full and
accurate disclosure require that the information be approved by S,
E's supervisor, before its submission to the attorney. At this point,
because the information was communicated to a third person before
reaching the attorney, the issue arises whether it was intended to be
confidential.
It may be recalled that when an individual client is incapable of
communicating complete information, communications by his agents
or experts that fill in the gaps are privileged.93 That situation is
similar to the problem confronted by corporate clients when a full
91. See discussion in pt. I. C. 3. supra.
92. See text following note 84 supra.
98. See notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text.
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and accurate disclosure to an attorney requires a combination of the
talents of two or more employees working under one or more supervisors. Thus, in order to foster the policy of encouraging full and
accurate disclosure by clients and to maintain the analogy to the
individual-client situation, communications within the corporation
that are necessary for completeness and accuracy of information given
the attorney should be considered confidential even though they
have been communicated to third persons. However, holding them
confidential, without any restrictions, would facilitate the creation
of zones of silence. This danger would be substantially eliminated if
the class of persons to whom the communication can be disclosed
without losing the protection of the privilege was limited to those
persons who, because of the structure of the corporation, must know
of the communication in order to insure that the attorney is obtaining both full and accurate information. Thus, it is submitted that
such a communication should be considered confidential if all the
employees with knowledge of it obtained that knowledge as a direct
result of having performed their assigned jobs, and if the pertinent
information was associated directly with their work.
The difficulty ·with ascertaining whether a communication by a
corporate employee is confidential can also arise in a second situation. An attorney may obtain confidential information that he must
pass on to the corporation's executives so that they will have all of
the facts necessary for making a decision. In order to make an informed decision, these decision makers must have not only the advice of the attorney but also knowledge of the facts upon which that
advice is based.94 Thus, in order properly to perform his function,
the attorney must be able to reveal fully to decision makers the substance of what he has learned from corporate employees and the
ramifications thereof without fearing that he would thereby remove
the privilege from information that would otherwise be protected.915
Therefore, it would be appropriate and consistent with the underlying policies of the privilege to hold that information that is communicated in confidence by a corporate employee-an information
giver-to an attorney remains confidential when that information is
subsequently related by the attorney to the corporation's decisionmakers in order to advise them fully concerning possible litigation.
In conclusion, then, it can be seen that in order for the corporate
privilege to be analogous to the individual privilege, information
must be regarded as confidential when it is communicated by information givers to the attorney and when the attorney passes the
94. Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer: The Attorney-Client Privilege and "Work Product" in Illinois, 56 ILL. B.J. 542, 547 (1968).
95. Wigmore states, "[t]hat the attorney's communications to the client are also
within the privilege was always assumed in the earlier cases and has seldom been
brought into question." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2320.
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communication on to the decision makers. The danger of permitting
the creation of zones of silence can be ameliorated by restricting the
group of individuals who may communicate privileged information-that is, by restricting the group of persons who may be regarded as the corporate client.

3. Was the Employee a Corporate Client?
If a particular communication survives the barriers erected by
the first four steps of the suggested analysis, a court must then determine whether the employee or employees making the communication fit within the definition of "corporate client." Here the naturalperson concept as formulated in the selective approach96 provides a
viable analytic base.
Since the individual client functions in the capacity of both information giver and decision maker, a corporate attorney-client privilege that is analogous to that afforded an individual should cover
communications from both the corporation's decision makers and
its information givers. But the corporate privilege should also
reflect the countervailing policy of preventing corporations from
placing unnecessarily large amounts of material in the privileged
category. It is submitted that both of these policies can be effectuated
if only employees who are the natural or appropriate persons to be
speaking or listening for the corporation are considered to be the
corporate client, and if the term "natural person" is clearly and concisely defined. Under the proposed approach an employee would
qualify as such a natural person if (1) he is the highest-ranking individual within the corporate structure to have access to the information, and he either (a) obtained the information as a direct result of
performing the job assigned to him by his employer and such information is associated directly with his work, or (b) obtained
knowledge of the information because the communication was
passed to him-as a supervisor of another corporate client-for
approval of changes in the normal company flow for that type of
communication within the corporation; or (2) he obtained the information from the attorney as a member of the corporation's control group.
C. Evaluation of the Suggested Approach
If followed, the suggested approach should eliminate the difficulties associated with the other approaches because it meets the three
prerequisites of a viable approach. First, it is analogous to the privilege afforded individuals. Clearly, the individual privilege has been
extended to cover communications that are from or through agents
or interpreters, or that constitute reports of specialists or experts
employed by the client or by the attorney when the client is incap96. See pt. I. C. 2. supra.
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able of communicating correct and sufficient information to the attorney.97 It is equally clear that communications by the attorney to
the client or his agent are privileged.98 These principles are consistent with the fact that an individual client, acting for himself or
through agents, both provides information to his attorney and makes
decisions based on that advice. By defining the "corporate client" as
that person in the corporation who can either provide correct and
sufficient information to the attorney or obtain the information from
the attorney so that a decision can be made, the suggested definition
of "client" is analogous to that presently used in the individual
situation.
Second, the proposed approach fosters the privilege without unduly restricting it. Because this approach would provide a court
with a set of objective standards for determining whether an employee functions as a corporate client, an attorney should be able to
predict with a reasonable degree of certainty whether a contemplated
communication would be privileged. The unpredictability that
would remain would be little more than that which presently faces
an attorney with an individual client, since the suggested approach
would be analogous to the personal privilege. The increased predictability would thus promote the major purpose of the privilegefostering the freedom to seek legal advice-by removing fears that
the attorney might subsequently be compelled to disclose the communication.
Moreover, the proposed approach would not encourage the creation of zones of silence by corporations. In applying this approach a
court would look at any given situation and determine whether
someone in the control group was seeking legal advice, whether the
communication was made in confidence, and whether it was made by
an individual who functioned as a corporate client. Any attempt by
a corporation to funnel all of its records through an attorney, and
thus create a zone of silence around its entire operation, would be
discovered by the courts at one or more of the steps in the analysis.
For example, funneling everyday business records-such as sales contracts, interoffice memoranda, letters to and from persons outside the
corporation, or minutes of meetings-to an attorney would not automatically make those records privileged. In most cases a member of
the control group would not have actively sought legal advice about
matters involved in a particular business record. Further, when legal
advice is sought, the privilege would apply only to those documents
that were related to the subject on which the advice was sought.
Finally, the records that could successfully clear the first two hurdles
would probably not have been made and treated in a confidential
manner.
97. See notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text.
98. See note 95 supra.
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Finally, the approach satisfies the third precept necessary for an
effective corporate attorney-client privilege since it avoids any conflict with the dictum of Hickman v. Taylor. 99 The information that
an employee obtains as a mere witness to an event will not be privileged because he did not obtain the information while acting as a
supervisor of the employees who did prepare the information, or
because-when such information was associated directly with his
work-he did not obtain the information as a direct result of performing the job assigned to him. This latter situation can best be
explained through illustration. A communication from a truck
driver employed by a corporation who negligently hits someone
would be covered by the privilege because the information would be
a direct result of the performance of his job and would be associated
directly with the nature of his work. On the other hand, a dock hand
who witnessed the accident could not make a privileged communication. Although the information may have been a direct result of the
performance of his job-being at his place of duty at the time he
witnessed the accident-the information was not associated directly
with his work-the loading of trucks. Thus, under both the Hickman
dictum and the suggested approach, any communication by the dock
hand to the corporation's attorney would not be protected.
In addition to satisfying the three precepts that are essential to
an effective corporate privilege, the suggested approach provides a
relatively simple analysis. Under the traditional approaches the
courts have attempted to apply a definition of the term "client,"
which developed primarily from precedents involving individuals,
to an artificial entity. The suggested approach, however, would enable a court to solve problems by applying familiar principles that
are not concerned with the nature of the client. Then, when the
court reaches the conceptually difficult area-if it does at all100-it
will have already collected sufficient information about the corporation, the communication, the employee who made the communication, and the attorney to be able to determine whether the definition
of "corporate client" covers the employee. By thus separating and
narrowing the factual issues, the ultimate inquiry will become less
difficult.
D. A Hypothetical Case

The over-all application of this suggested approach is best understood by examining a hypothetical case, the facts of which are similar
to those presented in Harper & Row. 101 Assume that BQF Corpo99. 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947). See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.

100. In most situations the communication probably will be determined to be unprivileged either because legal advice was not being sought or because the communication was not made in confidence.
101. See text accompan)ing notes 2-7 supra. The facts reported by the district
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ration is being investigated by a federal grand jury for alleged pricefixing activities, and that the grand jury has subpoenaed several
employees of the corporation to testify before it. Because of their
concern about possible future litigation involving the alleged activities, BQF's board of directors has authorized the corporation's president to consult an attorney.
The attorney informs the president that in order to advise the
corporation properly on what action to take to avoid or to defend
against any future litigation, he must, among other things, learn as
much as possible about what BQF's employees have told the grand
jury. Because of the secrecy of the proceedings, it is decided that this
can best be accomplished by the attorney debriefing each employee
after he testifies. Each employee is accordingly debriefed, and after
each debriefing the attorney writes a short memorandum concerning
the substance of the witness' testimony. A private plaintiff subsequently sues BQF in federal court for damages resulting from the
alleged price-fixing activities, and moves the court to order BQF to
produce the debriefing memoranda. The issue therefore arises
whether these memoranda are protected by the attorney-client
privilege.
The hypothetical has been set up so that the :first four steps of
the approach have been satisfied: legal advice was sought by a member of the control group, the advice was sought from a professional
legal advisor, the communications were clearly related to the potential litigation about which advice was being sought, and the communication was made with an intent that it be confidential-no one
was present at the time of the debriefing other than the attorney
and the specific employee involved, and the attorney revealed the
communications only to members of the corporation's control group.
Whether or not each communication will be privileged will therefore depend on whether each employee was a corporate client with
reference to the particular information that he gave to the attorney.
Employee A, who is a district sales manager for the corporation,
related the details of a meeting that he attended at which the corporation's various district sales managers discussed the prices that
BQF would charge during the coming year. Under the suggested
approach, A's communication will be privileged only if, at the time
he attended the meeting, part of his job was to attend such meetings.
If so, the information was obtained as a direct result of his performing his job as a sales manager, and the information is associated
court and by the court of appeals in Harper &- Row are very similar to the facts of
this hypothetical case. Because the courts did not apply the suggested approach, they
did not collect all of the information necessary for its application. Therefore, certain
facts have been assumed in the hypothetical case so that the proposed approach
could be applied to a situation that reflects the problems presented in Harper &- Row.
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directly with an aspect of his work-that of being informed of the
corporation's pricing policies so that he can set the prices for his
district.
Employee B, another district sales manager, not only talked about
the same meeting, but he also told the attorney about a cocktail
party he had attended with the sales managers of the corporation's
closest competitors. He testified that at this party, general pricing
information was exchanged and price brackets for each corporation
were informally established. After applying the suggested test, it
becomes clear that only a portion of the communication about the
cocktail party will be covered by the attorney-client privilege. Assuming that the information was obtained as a direct result of B
performing his job as a sales manager, some of the information may
nevertheless not be associated directly with that job. As a sales
manager his job may include establishing the prices for his own district, learning from the corporation what prices he must charge, and
generally overseeing the sales activities in his area. However, his job
is directly associated only with his corporation's prices and his own
district, and not with overhearing conversations in which the corporation's competitors discuss their prices. In regard to the conversations in which BQF's competitors discussed their prices, B is merely
a witness. While attendance at such a party may be part of his job,
listening to competitors discuss their prices is probably not associated
directly with his duties as a sales manager. This determination would
ultimately rest on how broadly the courts would allow any given
employee's job to be defined. If the courts would allow the job
definition to include the performance of illegal activities-including
price-fixing-then a corporation could, in part, expand the scope of
the privilege and defeat attempts to limit it reasonably. However,
a discussion of the policies that should be applied to and the limits
that should be placed on the definition of an employee's job is beyond the scope of this N ote.102

III.

CONCLUSION

At the present time, courts are uncertain which persons within a
corporation may be considered as the client for purposes of applying
102. The decisions and articles dealing with the vicarious liability of employers for
the acts of employees may be useful in attempting to determine the scope of an
employee's job for purposes of the suggested approach. See A. CoNARD &: R. KNAUSS,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE I.Aw OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 91-134 (3d ed. 1965);
F. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE I.Aw OF AGENCY §§ 364-411 (4th ed. 1952); w. SEAVEY,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 83-89 (1964); REs'I'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§§ 228-l:7 (1958); Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 115-26 (1916);
Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 Coum. L. REv. 444 (1923). It also might be helpful
to examine the concepts that have developed in determining the extent of the fiduciary
responsibility of an agent to account for gains to his principal. See A. CONARD &
R. KNAuss, supra, at 497-528.
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the attorney-client privilege. All of the tests that are presently being
used by the courts and that have previously been proposed have
some significant shortcoming. Either they leave the attorney-client
privilege open to abuse by allowing the creation of broad zones of
silence around corporations, or they leave the attorney in a perplexed state, so that he cannot confidently predict which communications will be privileged. The former problem leads to an impermissible degree of corporate secrecy that gives the corporation a
major advantage over its individual adversary and that unduly
interferes with the truth-finding process. The latter problem discourages corporations from fully disclosing pertinent information to
attorneys, and consequently prevents the attorneys from adequately
representing their clients.
The proposed approach should substantially solve these problems. The system is conceptually easy to apply; therefore, an attorney
should be able to predict with reasonable certainty what information will be protected by the corporate attorney-client privilege.
This certainty should encourage corporations to disclose fully important information to their attorneys. Further, because the suggested approach restricts the scope of the corporate privilege and is
easy for courts to apply, it will enable the courts to control attempts
by corporations to build broad zones of silence around their corporate affairs.

